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ABSTRACT
We analyze information security investment decisions by two firms that possess imperfectly substitutable information assets.
Information assets are imperfectly substitutable if information at each firm is valuable and becomes more valuable when
combined. When compared to optimal investment decisions made by a central planner, we find diametrically opposite results
in the case where these decisions are made independently: substitutable assets lead to an “arms race” in which both firms
over-invest whereas complementary assets lead to under-provision of “public goods” in which both firms under-invest. We
also find that firms with highly substitutable information assets may not necessarily increase the amount of security
investment in a centralized investment environment as the intensity of the deflected cross traffic increases.
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INTRODUCTION
The importance of information security has increased in recent times as more firms use the internet to conduct business
transactions. Businesses have begun to store a large amount of information in corporate networks relating to customer
profiles, product sales, and R&D information. Furthermore, information security has become a major concern for e-
businesses as the volume of cyber attacks has increased over the past few years.
Several researchers have studied the economic impacts of information security investments. Gordon & Loeb (2002) study
how the level of information vulnerability and expected loss affects the optimal level of investment for a firm. Using a
similar modeling framework, Gordon et. al (2003) examine how sharing information across firms affects the overall
investment level. Gal-Or and Ghose (2002) analyze how the sharing of security information between two firms influences
security investments and price competition between these firms. However, previous research has not studied how the
changing of the behavior of a hacker may affect information security investment decisions made by two firms given the
nature of information assets stored by these two firms.
Two pieces of information are substitutable to a hacker if a piece of information from one firm is of little additional value to
her once she has obtained the other piece of information from the other firm. Thus having acquired one piece of information
the hacker would stop since there is no economic incentive to risk being caught while hacking the second firm. If however,
the first attempt at hacking is unsuccessful, the hacker would likely try to hack the second firm. Such unsuccessful hacking
attempts lead to deflected cross traffic.
Two pieces of information in two firms are complementary to a hacker if obtaining both pieces of information from both
firms is very valuable while one piece of information alone has little value. The hacker therefore would continue to attack the
second firm when the attempt at the first form is successful. Such successful hacking attempts lead to penetrated cross
traffic.
In reality, two pieces of related information are usually imperfectly substitutable. For example, one firm might store
information on customer addresses and the other might store information on customer bank accounts. Each piece of
information  is  valuable  in  its  own  right  to  a  hacker,  so  some  hackers  may  be  satisfied  after  obtaining  only  one  piece  of
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information. Other hackers might attempt to steal both pieces of information so that they can match the records in order to
commit financial fraud, such as making a money transfer out of an account. When two pieces of information stored by two
firms are stolen and matched, each company could suffer a larger loss than when only one piece of information is stolen. For
imperfectly substitutable information, some hackers may attempt to hack the second firm even if they fail to penetrate the
first firm. Other hackers may attempt to hack the second firm only if they succeed in penetrating the first firm. Thus to make
our analysis general, we need to consider both deflected and penetrated cross traffic.
The objective of this paper is to analytically compare individual (i.e., independent) investment decisions made by two firms
with the optimal (i.e., centralized) investment decision in the presence of imperfectly substitutable information assets.
THE MODEL
In this model, we consider two firms with imperfectly substitutable information, i.e., information at each firm is valuable and
becomes more valuable when combined. Hence, a firm will incur an additional loss when hackers obtain combined
information. If hackers fail to penetrate the first firm, a fraction p  of them will continue to attack the other firm. A fraction
q  of hackers who successfully penetrate the first firm continue to attack the second one to get more information. If only one
firm is hacked, the cost of penetration to the hacked firm isu , if both firms are hacked, the cost to each firm is vu + .
Firms can improve information system security by investing in security technologies such as anti-virus software, firewalls or
intrusion detection systems. Let Z  be the investment amount and )(Zf  be the corresponding security breach function
defined as the probability of being penetrated by an attack with the investment amount Z . Consistent with prior literature
(Gordon and Loeb, 2002), we assume that ],1,0[)( ÎZf 0)(' <Zf  and 0)(" >Zf , that is, as the investment in security
increases, the information system becomes more secure, but at a diminishing rate.
Our  model  is  depicted  in  the  Figure  1.  Firms A and B invest  amounts AZ  and BZ  to secure their systems. We assume
N hackers attempt to attack the two firms with equal probability since hackers have no prior information of the vulnerability
at each firm. For firm A, the number of initial hackers (= 2/N ) who succeed is given by )(2/ AZfN ×  and q portion of
these hackers continue to attack the second firm (shown as ABE  in Figure 1). Of those who fail in the initial attack, p
portion of hackers, denoted by ABD  ( )](1[2/ AZfNp -××= ), switch to attack firm B. The remaining hackers exit the
system. For firm B, we have a similar situation.  We do not consider learning effects of hackers or the firms in this model.
Since these two firms are homogeneous, the order of attacking on the firms does not affect the penetration probability and
cost.
              Figure 1: The hacking structure of the imperfectly substitutable information
The total cost )( AZh for firm A that invests AZ  in information security, given that the investment level at firm B is BZ , is
given by
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[ ] )1()()())(1()(1)(2/)( ABABBAAA ZZfZfvqNZfpZfqZfuNZh +×+-+×+=
The total cost )( BZh is similarly obtained. Of the three terms in the square bracket in (1), the second one represents the cost
due to penetrated cross traffic BAE  and  the  third  one  due  to  deflected  cross  traffic BAD .   The  second  term  in  (1)  is  the
additional cost to firm A when both companies are penetrated. When firm B increases its spending BZ , its system
vulnerability )( BZf  decreases. This leads to an increase in the cost to firm A due to the cross traffic BAD  and a decrease in
cost due to BAE . Thus there are positive and negative externalities associated with security investments made by the two
firms. The net effect due to BAE  and BAD depends on the investment level and the damage cost u and v .
ANALYSIS OF MODEL
We consider two cases in the model. The first case studies firm investment level when firms make independent investment
decisions. The second case studies a situation where the firms cooperate and make a centralized investment decision on
information security.
Independent Investment Case
In the independent investment case, firm A and B make separate decisions on information security investment with a view to
minimize their individual cost functions. The first-order conditions (FOCs) are given by:
)2(02)()('2))](1()(1)[(' =+×+-+×+× BABBA ZfZfvqNZfpZfqZfuN
)3(02)()('2))](1()(1)[(' =+×+-+×+× ABAAB ZfZfvqNZfpZfqZfuN
These FOCs are symmetric and therefore we have a symmetric solution: DBA ZZZ == . For certain functional forms such
as  the  one  given  in  Gordon  and  Loeb(2002),  we  can  show  that  only  symmetric  solutions  exist.  To  obtain  an  analytical
solution, we need to assume a specific functional form for the security vulnerability function )(Zf .  In  this  work,  we are
more interested in gaining insights about the cross traffic intensity parameter p and q affect the investment level. In the
following propositions, without assuming a specific form of )(Zf , we characterize the impact of p and q on of
AZ and BZ .
Proposition 1. In the decentralized case of imperfectly substitutable information, the security investment level at one firm
will increase as more hackers switch to attack the other firm after an initial failure, i.e., 0/ >dpdZ D . (The proof is omitted
for brevity)
From Proposition 1, we obtain the intuitive result that as the deflected cross traffic increases ( p increases), both firms need
to invest more to make their system more secure. However it is not obvious whether this result will hold if the two firms
coordinate. Intuitively, when the cross hacking traffic to a firm increases, this firm would be expected to increase the
investment to reduce the damage. We will later examine whether this intuition is correct in the centralized case. Proposition 2
below shows that the investment level at each firm in information security increases with cross traffic parameter q .
Proposition 2. In independent case of imperfectly substitutable information, the security investment level will increase as
more hackers continue to attack the other firm after the first successful penetration.  (The proof is omitted for brevity).
The result from Proposition 2 is also intuitive. If more hackers move from one firm to attack the other firm, then more
security is needed. The interesting issue to explore next is whether this result in the independent case holds in the centralized
case.
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Centralized Investment Case
Two firms can form an alliance to coordinate their investments on information security so that the total cost to the firms is
minimized. With coordinated investment, the benefit can be shared by the firms so they will be better off overall. The
objective of the alliance is to minimize overall cost
)()(),( BABA ZhZhZZH +=                                                                                                                      (4)
by choosing the optimal investment levels AZ  and BZ .
The two FOCs with respect to AZ  and BZ  are symmetric, and we can show that for certain functional forms such as the one
given in Gordon and Loeb (2002), there can only exist symmetric solutions. Therefore we limit out attention to the symmetric
solution CBA ZZZ == .  The FOC is given by
02)()('4))](21()(21)[(' =+×+-+×+× CCCCC ZfZfvqNZfpZfqZfuN                                                     (5)
Proposition 3. In the centralized case with imperfectly substitutable information, one firm’s investment ( CBA ZZZ == )
does not increase monotonically with p , the probability that a hacker will try to penetrate the second firm after failing at the
first firm. The sign of dpdZC /  is same as the sign of )(21 CZf- .
Proof: Taking the derivative of (5)  w.r.t. p , we have
22 /
)(')1)(2(
C
CCC
ZH
ZuNfZf
p
Z
¶¶
-
=
¶
¶
(7)
Since CZ  minimizes the total cost H , we have 0/
22 >¶¶ CZH .  The  sign  of dpdZC / is  the  same  as  the  sign  of
)(21 CZf- since 0)(
' <CZf . Q.E.D.
Thus the result in the independent investment case does not carry over directly to the centralized investment case. Our
numerical results verify that dpdZC / could be positive or negative in different regions of the parameter space. For certain
types of retail firms that do not store sensitive customer information, security breach costs are relatively low ( u  and v  are
small). Hence it may be optimal to invest at a low level, i.e., )( CZf is likely to be higher than 1/2 .  In such situations it is
better to reduce the investment level so as to reduce deflected cross traffic if the cross traffic intensity p increases. On the
other hand, for certain types of e-commerce or financial firms that have very valuable customer information, the security
investment level is likely to be high (i.e., )( CZf is likely to be lower than 1/2). Here the investment level CZ  increases
with p . When two firms cooperate on security investments, a balance must be struck between the increase in direct
penetration cost and the reduction of investment cost together with the burden on the other firm due to cross traffic. In the
independent case, the two firms always increase the investment level to minimize individual losses when p increases.
Similar to Proposition 2 in the independent case, Proposition 4 shows that the investment level CZ  increases as q increases.
Proposition 4.  In the centralized case of imperfectly substitutable information, the security investment level
CZ ( )BA ZZ ==  increases as more hackers continue to attack the other firm after the successful penetration at the first
firm, i.e., .0/ >dqdZC
Proof: From (5), we take the derivative w.r.t. q ,
22 /
)2)((')(2
C
CCC
ZH
vuZfZNf
dq
dZ
¶¶
+-
= >0. Q.E.D.
 3321
Liu et al.   Information Security Investment with Different Information Types
Proceedings of the Eleventh Americas Conference on Information Systems, Omaha, NE, USA August 11th-14th 2005
Contrasting Proposition 3 with Proposition 4, we can see that the effects of p  and q  on the information security investment
are different because they measure cross traffic intensity from different aspects. The parameter q measures the proportion of
further penetration at the second firm after a successful penetration at the first firm. Therefore, improving individual security
levels should directly benefit each firm by reducing the chance of both initial and second penetration. Thus the investment
decisions at the two firms exhibit positive externalities. The effect due to p is more complicated due to negative
externalities. Increasing security at one firm comes at the expense of more attacks at the other firm since more hackers would
fail to penetrate the first firm. In the centralized investment case, positive and negative externality effects are balanced to
determine the coordinated investment level for each firm.
We have also compared the investment levels in the independent and centralized cases and summarized the results in
Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. For the imperfectly substitutable information, compared with investment in information security in centralized
case CZ , investment in the independent case DZ  is higher when 0qq < , lower when 0qq > and same when
0qq = where )2/(0 vuupq +×= .
Proof(Sketch): At 0qq = , DZ  and CZ satisfy the same FOC: 02)1)((' =++ pZuNf . Therefore, DC ZZ = when
0qq = . Otherwise, DC ZZ ¹  in pZ - plane.  Also, at 0qq = , .0//2/ >>= dqdZdqdZdqdZ DDC
Thus, we have CD ZZ > when 0qq < and CD ZZ <  when 0qq > . Q.E.D.
Proposition 5 provides some interesting results. When p  is large relative to q , i.e., 0qq < ,  the  firm  compete  in  the
independent environment to raise their individual security levels and deflect more hackers to their counterpart. Such negative
externalities lead to an “arm race”: both firms over invest. When q  is relatively large, firms wait for each other to reduce
cross traffic and under-invest. However the benefits of positive externality are not fully exploited in the independent case
leading to a situation similar to the under-provision of “public goods”.
CONCLUSION
We develop a model that studies how investment decision in information security is affected by the behavior of hackers in the
presence of investment externalities. Compared to optimal investment decisions made by a central planner, we obtain
opposite results when these decisions are made independently: holding substitutable information assets leads to an “arm race”
in which both firms over-invest whereas holding complementary information assets leads to the under-provision of “public
goods” in which both firms under-invest. Also we find the seemingly counter-intuitive result that the investment in the
centralized case does not necessarily increase with an increase with the intensity of cross traffic p. Here the direction of
change in the investment depends on the security breach cost u  and v . With these insights in mind, a third party, which
could be a social ware fare optimizer, can come up with a coordination scheme to achieve the optimum obtained in the
centralized case.
In future work, we plan to incorporate learning effects into a hacker’s behavior to study how the investment decision will
change. This learning effect could intensify the “arm race” and lead to a further under-provision of “public goods”.
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